Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Tom Barker	
Author-Name-First: Tom
Author-Name-Last: Barker
Author-Email: Tom.Barker@rbnz.govt.nz
Author-Workplace-Name: Reserve Bank of New Zealand
Author-Name: Murat Ungor
Author-Name-First: Murat
Author-Name-Last: Ungor
Author-Email: murat.ungor@otago.ac.nz
Author-Workplace-Name: Department of Economics, University of Otago, New Zealand
Title: Vietnam: The Next Asian Tiger?
Abstract:  We investigate the growth experience of Vietnam, the country which has been getting
recent attention as being the next emerging giant. First, we present an aggregate
level investigation of Vietnam's economic growth experience, since the inauguration of
reform in 1986 known as Doi Moi. We focus on a top-down approach that performs
growth and level accounting exercises. These decompositions offer the possibility to
track the economic progress of Vietnam and to formulate policy accordingly depending
on where the gaps originate from. Second, we build a two-sector general equilibrium
model, investigating the secular decline in agricultural employment. Despite the notable
structural changes over the past thirty years, agriculture still has a substantial
weight in the Vietnamese economy. We conduct a quantitative analysis using a theoretical
framework, with an emphasis on the counterfactual outcomes of inheriting Chinese
sectoral productivity growth rates, where China is recognized as the paragon emerging
economy. The main fndings are: (i) Vietnam has grown impressively since 1986, but is
still a relatively poor country in absolute terms; (ii) Vietnam must decrease its reliance
on factor accumulation as its source of growth and increase its technological capabilities;
(iii) economic policies should equally target both agricultural and nonagricultural
sectors to increase sectoral productivity growth rates in Vietnam.
Length: 53 pages
Creation-Date: 2018-03
Revision-Date: 2018-03
File-URL: http://www.otago.ac.nz/economics/otago682041.pdf
File-Format: Application/pdf
File-Function: First version, 2018
Number: 1803
Classification-JEL: N10, O47, O53, O57
Keywords: Vietnam; capital formation; convergence; deagriculturalization
Handle: RePEc:otg:wpaper:1803

Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Ronald Peeters
Author-Name-First: Ronald
Author-Name-Last: Peeters
Author-Email: ronald.peeters@otago.ac.nz
Author-Workplace-Name: Department of Economics, University of Otago, New Zealand
Author-Name: Anastas P. Tenev
Author-Name-First: Anastas
Author-Name-Last: Tenev
Author-Email: ap.tenev@maastrichtuniversity.nl
Author-Workplace-Name: Department of Economics, Maastricht University
Title: Number of bidders and the winner’s curse
Abstract:  Within an affiliated value auction setting, we study the relationship between the number
of bidders and the winner’s curse in terms of its occurrence and its expected harm. From a
design perspective, we find that both the number of bidders and the level of affiliation are
instrumental when choosing an auction format and whether to encourage or discourage
bidder participation.

Length: 7 pages
Creation-Date: 2018-01
Revision-Date: 2018-01
File-URL: http://www.otago.ac.nz/economics/otago673907.pdf
File-Format: Application/pdf
File-Function: First version, 2018
Number: 1802
Classification-JEL: D44, D82, H57
Keywords: Winner’s curse; number of bidders; affiliated value auctions
Handle: RePEc:otg:wpaper:1802


Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Ronald Peeters
Author-Name-First: Ronald
Author-Name-Last: Peeters
Author-Email: ronald.peeters@otago.ac.nz
Author-Workplace-Name: Department of Economics, University of Otago, New Zealand
Author-Name: Marc Vorsatz
Author-Name-First: Marc
Author-Name-Last: Vorsatz
Author-Email: mvorsatz@cee.uned.es
Author-Workplace-Name: Departamento de An´alisis Econ´omico, Universidad Nacional de Educaci´on a Distancia, Calle Senda del Rey, Madrid, Spain
Title: Simple guilt and cooperation
Abstract:  We introduce simple guilt into a generic prisoner’s dilemma (PD) game and solve for the
equilibria of the resulting psychological game. It is shown that for all guilt parameters, it is
a pure strategy equilibrium that both players defect. But, if the guilt parameter surpasses a
threshold, a mixed strategy equilibrium and a pure strategy equilibrium in which both players
cooperate emerge. We implement three payoff constellations of the PD game in a laboratory
experiment and find in line with our equilibrium analysis that first- and second-order beliefs
are highly correlated and that the probability of cooperation depends positively on these
beliefs. Finally, we provide numerical evidence on the degree of guilt cooperators experience
Length: 27 pages
Creation-Date: 2018-01
Revision-Date: 2018-01
File-URL: http://www.otago.ac.nz/economics/research/discussion/otago672909.pdf
File-Format: Application/pdf
File-Function: First version, 2018
Number: 1801
Classification-JEL: C72, C91
Keywords: Psychological game theory, Guilt, Prisoner’s dilemma
Handle: RePEc:otg:wpaper:1801